Does the Franco-Egyptian educational cooperation reflect a strategic political alignment? – Chada Bachri

President Emmanuel Macron (centre) and the Egyptian Minister for Higher Education, Ayman Achour (right), surrounded by students at the Franco-Egyptian Conference on Higher Education and Research, University of Cairo, 7 April 2025.
Within a historical framework, Egypt has consistently held a strategic geopolitical position in the eyes of successive French governments. On the one hand, this has facilitated enduring educational cooperation initiatives, and on the other, contributed to the expansion of Francophonie in the region which has functioned as a key instrument of France’s soft power strategy, reinforcing its cultural and diplomatic influence in North Africa and the Middle East.
Currently, and within Egypt’s 2030 vision in terms of educational reforms, a notable intensification of educational internationalization has been observed. Among the key partners involved, France has maintained a consistent presence, framing Francophonie as a strategic axis of bilateral engagement. These initiatives appear to align with France’s broader diplomatic agenda in the region, suggesting a convergence of educational cooperation and geopolitical interest. The timing of these developments, particularly amid intensifying regional conflicts and diplomatic realignments, further underscores the need to consider education as a policy field embedded in foreign affairs.
While these cooperations – through more than 40 bilateral agreements signed during the Franco-Egyptian Symposium on 7 April[1] – obviously aim to deepen Franco-Egyptian academic, educational and cultural ties, they also serve as core component of France’s soft power diplomacy, as stated by the President Emannuel Macron «Francophonie is a space of diplomatic influence that allows us to embrace the challenges of the century,»[2] at the opening of the summit in Villers-Cotterêts in october 2024, and in other similar occasions. The convergence of French and Egyptian positions on certain regional security issues, such as Egypt’s rejection of hosting Palestinian refugees, invites inquiry into whether educational diplomacy is functioning here as a legitimizing instrument within broader policy coordination.
These high-level visits, budgetary commitments, institutional and educational partnerships, all signal an intensification of French engagement that extends beyond pedagogical goals, given their timing and context. These dynamics suggest that scientific and academic collaboration may serve as a vector for affirming particular state narratives, especially when set against a backdrop of strategic border securitization and international competition. The function of education in this context appears less as a neutral sphere and more as a site of symbolic negotiation and geopolitical orientation. Thus, such dynamics call for an examination of how academic diplomacy might be deployed within France’s foreign policy agenda, especially in conflict-ridden geopolitical spaces like the Middle East.
The multidimensional character of this cooperation became particularly visible during President Macron’s visit to Egypt on April 6. Beyond the political and economic dimensions of the visit[3], the emphasis placed on linguistic and cultural initiatives, such as reaffirming the place of French in the Egyptian Baccalaureate, that was emphasized in his speech at Cairo University on 7 April, «Then I told President Al-Sissi that, in the reforms Egypt wished to undertake, we wanted to be an active partner, and that French should continue to be at the heart of the Egyptian Baccalaureate». This statement might signal France’s intention to maintain a strong linguistic and cultural footprint in a region where geopolitical competition is increasingly intense, especially when considering the willingness of the Ministry of Education to continue supporting the Trèfle project[4]. Thus, comparing the French President’s statement to the aforementioned meeting between the Egyptian Minister of Education and the French Ambassador to Cairo might indicate a step back from the previous decision to marginalize the role of French in the Egyptian Baccalaureate. If that is not the case, Egypt’s openness to the expansion of private Francophone institutions, by approving the construction of 100 Francophone school by the 2030 horizon might, in all cases, be even more beneficial to France’s ideological and strategic objectives in the region.
As notes (Plasmans, 2010), the French strategy of influence in Egypt following 1904 marked a shift from territorial ambitions to symbolic investments in language, education, and cultural presence. It is within this historical continuity that the reemergence of French as a second foreign language in the Egyptian thānawiyya ʿāmma system (equivalent of British GCSE or French Baccalauréat), following its earlier marginalization, might be situated. This reinstatement may be interpreted as part of a wider negotiation around the place of language in national identity and international alliances. Simultaneously, Egypt’s decision in 2022 to incorporate Chinese language education and attract significant Chinese investment (estimated at $8 billion across sectors such as textiles, electronics, and animal feed[5]) suggests a pragmatic diversification of its neoliberal ideology within an international context. This context raises questions about the ideological flexibility that informs current educational reforms and the extent to which such choices are driven by political contingency and budgetary constraint.
Egypt’s position as a central partner for France in the Middle East, particularly amid current geopolitical tensions, can be interpreted as a strategy for France to maintain regional visibility. Since 2018, France has significantly expanded its educational cooperation with Egypt, engaging at nearly all levels and sectors of the education system. This collaboration encompasses various initiatives, ranging from financial support to the establishment of new educational institutions[6]. Through such initiatives, France positions itself not only as a supporter of knowledge but also as a long-term actor within Egypt’s educational framework. While these initiatives are formally cooperative, they may also serve as instruments of symbolic power, contributing to the formation of a new Francophone generation and long-term discursive influence.
Conclusion
This analysis has not sought to explore the technicalities of the negotiations that took place on April 6–8 during President Macron’s visit to Egypt. Rather, it has examined the discursive and strategic underpinnings of the educational/linguistic cooperation between France and Egypt. In doing so, it invites inquiry into the long-term cultural effects of such cooperation, particularly with regard to identity construction, symbolic authority, and the possibility of cultural hegemony. Furthermore, the current context raises the question of whether similar forces might be at work today, given Egypt’s historical susceptibility to reform under external pressures, economic or geopolitical. On another level, does this refreshed engagement signal a structural embedding of foreign cultural paradigms within the national educational system? Or does it reflect a tactical realignment within global political architectures? Finally, from the French perspective, what institutional rationales or strategic calculations might sustain these educational initiatives beyond the immediate diplomatic horizon?
Chada Bachri

The Franco-Egyptian Conference on Scientific and University Cooperation, 7 April 2025, Coupole Amphitheatre, Cairo University, Egypt
Works Cited
Plasmans, D. (2010). L’outil culturel dans la politique d’influence de la France en Égypte (1914-1936). Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, 12-19.
[1] Youm7. “مصر وفرنسا تطلقان مرحلة جديدة من التعاون الاستراتيجي في التعليم والبحث العلمي.” Youm7, 7 April 2025, https://www.youm7.com/story/2025/4/7/مصر-وفرنسا-تطلقان-مرحلة-جديدة-من-التعاون-الاستراتيجي-في-التعليم/6945514.
[2] France 24. (2024, October 4). XIXe sommet de la Francophonie : Emmanuel Macron salue une « communauté unie et solidaire ». France 24. Retrieved from https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20241004-%F0%9F%94%B4-en-direct-ouverture-xixe-sommet-francophonie-discours-emmanuel-macron
[3] France24. (2025, April 6). Emmanuel Macron en Égypte pour discuter de la guerre à Gaza et des partenariats stratégiques. France 24. https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20250406-emmanuel-macron-en-%C3%A9gypte-pour-discuter-de-la-guerre-%C3%A0-gaza-et-des-partenariats-strat%C3%A9giques
[4] Originally signed in 2020, this initiative aims to develop French language programs in Egyptian public schools by supporting curriculum development for French as a living language, and by improving teacher evaluation systems through training programs benefiting 13,000 French language teachers and instructors in public schools, with the goal of enhancing their professional competencies (source: Ministry of Education and Technical Education. (2023, March 9). The Minister of Education and Technical Education and the Ambassador of France in Cairo honor the beneficiaries of the training program. https://moe.gov.eg/en/what-s-on/news/trefle/)
[5] Egypt Today. (2024, October 26). 2,066 Chinese companies operate in Egypt with $8 billion worth investments: Official. Egypt Today. https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/135666/2-066-Chinese-companies-operate-in-Egypt-with-8-bln
[6] Shorouk News. (2025, March 20). وزير التعليم ونظيره الفرنسي يناقشان خطط إنشاء 100 مدرسة مصرية فرنسية بحلول عام 2030. بوابة الشروق.
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CEDEJ (16 avril 2025). Does the Franco-Egyptian educational cooperation reflect a strategic political alignment? – Chada Bachri. Les Carnets du CEDEJ. Consulté le 15 mai 2025 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/13ren